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The memory of the senses Any hint of flavor, just a hint, leads through a tunnel back to a light: the memory of my favorite stew. I never had words for it in the first place, although, when I am inebriated with memory, emotions about the ghostly meal rattle around.
-Jeff Weinstein, "Thyme and Word Enough"
Seeing is not eating.
--Hausa proverb
There has been increasing interest in the past several years among film-and videomakers and "visual" artists to supplement vision with the experiences of hearing, touch, smell, taste, and kinesthesis. Es pecially in documentary, this turn to the nonvisual senses has been in part a response to the perceived imperialism of vision, the align ment of visual information with knowledge and control (although, as I argued in the last chapter, vision need not be synonymous with mastery). In some cases, documentary appeals to what escapes the visual altogether but can be known, for example, through the sense of touch, or of smell. The knowledge of the other senses is sought, not necessarily to create a sort of multisensory gesamtkunstwerk, but to show the limits of any of these knowledges.
Throughout these chapters I have been suggesting that unrepre sentable memories find their expression in the characteristic gaps of experimental cinema, or what Deleuze calls time-image cinema. The "shattering of the sensory-motor schema" (Deleuze 1989, 55) that characterizes time-image cinema describes a suspension of the usual relations among the senses and their automatic extension into movement. I suggest that the very perceptual forms that encode memory may be revealed, by this shattering effect, to be culturally 195 specific. Film's "physical shock effect" (Benjamin 1968c, 238) is its potential to disrupt the commonsense patterns of sense experience, ^ making room for new cultural organizations of perception. Cinema ^ can be the site of new configurations of sense knowledge, produced © in (or in spite of) the encounter between different cultures. o The cinema of cultural displacement often focuses on loss: of Ian-0 guage, of custom, of one's place in a community. However, a dis-£. course of loss alone cannot explain the transformations and new </> CD productions of culture and consciousness that occur in diaspora. g
CD
These chapters have moved from discourses of loss and unknoww ability to new conditions of knowledge: a shift that reflects the move in intercultural cinema in the last ten years or so from works of protest to works of synthesis, from excavation to transformation. When language cannot record memories, we often look to images. When images fail to revive memory, we may look to the well-kept secrets of objects. Unpacking the secrets encoded in images and ob jects, we find the memory of the senses. This final chapter explores the representation of sense knowledge in intercultural contexts. Yet the films and videos I examine here must still deal with loss, for when the memory of the senses fails-when there are no people who can awaken the knowledge of an object in their own bodiesthe loss itself becomes an element of public culture (Seremetakis 1994, 8) . Intercultural artists cannot simply recreate the sensory ex perience of their individual or cultural past. Instead, intercultural cinema bears witness to the reorganization of the senses that takes place, and the new kinds of sense knowledges that become possible, when people move between cultures. In this final chapter, then, I will argue that the senses are a source of social knowledge. This will require an excursion into the psychol ogy and neurophysiology of sense memory, in which I focus on the sense of smell. I will point out that the organization of the senses, that is, the sensorium, varies culturally as well as individually; thus we would expect cinema to represent the sensorial organization of a given culture. Often the sensorium is the only place where cul tural memories are preserved. For intercultural cinema, therefore, sense experience is at the heart of cultural memory. All this evi dence of the rich cultivation of sense experience is only useful for understanding cinema if we can understand the cinematic experience to be multisensory: I will argue that it is, even beyond devices like Odorama, given a viewer's mimetic and synesthetic inclina tions. One would expect that artists would be somewhat suspicious of the cinematic apparatus's ability to represent their precious, and often nonaudiovisual, sensory knowledges: I will look at a number of works, particularly by aboriginal artists, to see how they stretch the apparatus to express these knowledges. A look at Julie Dash's Daughters of the Dust and related works explores how intercultural artists use the medium to represent the importance of sensuous and bodily memories.
Of course, with intercultural cinema, there is not only one sensorium at work. Diasporan people inhabit at least two: that of their culture of origin, and the new sensory organization in which they find themselves. Consequently, I will suggest that many intercul tural works are ambivalent about their ability to represent the tra ditional sensory experience; this distinguishes them from the exoticizing films that serve their eager audience the sensuous life of another culture on a platter.
The work of Black Audio Film Collective was what first drew my attention to the way cinema calls upon the senses when other sources of history/memory are inaccessible. I have mentioned Black Audio's interest in using rituals and evocative tableaux in their styl ized documentaries. Reece Auguiste's Mysteries of July (1991) , in particular, evokes the knowledge of the senses in order to intensify a social protest. The short film begins with the fact that an inordinate number of young Black men in England die in police custody. As do many Black Audio films, it begins where the known facts end, for, not surprisingly, there are no official records of the circumstances of these deaths. The film reconstructs one of the deaths, making it clear that it was the result of the British police's institutionalized racism. But it does not stop here. Auguiste recognizes that the deci sive laying of blame, when there is no legal recourse to convict the killers, cannot heal the pain in the Black community. Instead, Mysteries of July enacts an elaborate ritual of mourning. Candles and incense burn at a memorial altar decorated with flowers and rich satin, which reflects their light in pools of intense color. Mourners walk slowly, in silence, carrying candles. In a scene of grief and rage, these colors, textures, and imagined smells take on an intensity that cannot be expressed verbally or visually. Four years after I saw Mysteries of July, I watched a short videotape that seemed to reduce all my ideas about cinema and sense experi ence to a one-liner. Toronto videomaker Steve Reinke's project "The Hundred Videos" (1992-95) is a collection of very short pieces, many of which are exquisite, condensed theses, almost haikus, about the impossibility of representing truth in documentary cinema. One of these tapes consists of a close-up of the lower half of a man's (pale, stubbly) face. He extrudes his tongue and uses it to insert small pieces of canned fruit cocktail into his nostrils, first one, then the other. Then he does the same with canned peas and carrots. That's all. The tape is called Instructions for Recovering Forgotten Childhood Memories (1993) .
Part of Reinke's joke is that the banal and slightly disgusting act of putting canned fruit up your nose is supposed to have the power to reach deep levels of the psyche. Part of it is a joke on psychoanalysis: one wishes it could be so easy to recover forgotten memories. But also Reinke raises the issue of how memories are embodied in the senses. Using your tongue to put pieces of canned fruit in your nose calls upon many kinds of sensory awareness: taste; smell; the inimi table feeling of a slimy canned pear sliding up your face from one sensitive membrane to another; the physical dexterity required to do this. It is a rich multisensory experience that many children and surely a few adults have had. But Reinke is also calling upon a par ticular cultural memory, common to those of us who regularly ate canned fruits and vegetables as children. Not everybody can iden tify with this act.
This short tape raises some of the questions I will approach in this chapter: What experiences are so beyond cinematic representation that they require extra-audiovisual means? How does one represent sense memory? Is it a process of narrative identification, of bodily identification? Can the mere audiovisual representation of a gustatorial act successfully arouse lost memories; or, as Reinke's title ("Instructions") suggests, must one physically carry out the act one self? And what are the intercultural limits of such memory: can one identify with sense memories one has never had?
In this chapter I continue to explore works that push the visual limits of cinema, and to appeal to the authority of nonvisual percep tion. I argue that in many cultures the sense of sight, while impor tant, is not as paramount as it is in postindustrial metropoli. Thus the antivisual turn often entails an appeal to cultures that cultivate the proximal senses. However, let me caution at the outset that, much as one might like, one cannot put on a sensorium like a suit of clothes and instantly be washed with new sensory perceptions. Sense knowledge is embedded in culture. It is more productive to look for the latent sensory abilities that already exist within a cul-199 ture, the tactile, smelly, and gustatory knowledges and pleasures that exist alongside the more "elevated" distance knowledges. Also, ^ the seeker of sensation should know that sense knowledge, like any ° cultural knowledge, is always migrating and transforming. CD Once more, let me point to some of the limits of this extravisual o exploration. Vision is the primary sense in most cultures for good 0 reason. Everybody needs senses that operate over distance, which g. vision and hearing do best. There are interesting exceptions: for ex-^ CD ample, the Umeda people of the New Guinea rainforest use smell as g CD a distance sense, for they hunt in dense forests where it is not easy w to see or hear one's predators or prey (Classen, Howes, and Synnott 1994, 98) . My project is not to attempt to overthrow the visual altogether, but to relativize the uses of the senses according to dif ferent cultural organizations of the sensorium.
Sense Memory as Social Memory
As I suggested in chapter 1, attempts to reconstruct experience by digging in archives of public and private memory are full of pit falls, since often these experiences are normalized upon interpre tation into film language, rather than remaining destabilizing and "radioactive." How to allow experience to retain its strangeness and urztranslatability? Even the oral history, which is held to be one of the least invasive ways to represent social memory, tends to deter mine the shape of its responses by fitting the interviewee into the framework of dominant history (Connerton 1989) . Paul Connerton suggests that these stories may be discovered not in narrative form but in the evidence of ritual, gesture, and other embodied forms of memory. These memories are especially crucial as repositories of knowledge for people whose experience is not represented in the dominant society. The memory of the senses, a nontransparent and differentially available body of information, is important to every body as a source of individual knowledge. For cultural minorities, it is an especially important source of cultural knowledge. The histo ries recorded in the body reveal other patterns than those signaled by elections, the passage of laws, national credit ratings, and other big-ticket signs of shifts in the global sociopolitical sphere. I sug gested in chapter 2 that the intercultural travels of seemingly idio-200 syncratic and "private" objects are often signs of political events that do not register on public scales. Embodied memories and experig ences may well be some of the most important registers of global 53 shifts in power and the emergence of new subjectivities. And as rTj Elaine Scarry points out, the body remains a political witness de-"o spite efforts to "reeducate" it. She retells Bruno Bettelheim's story £ from the concentration camps in which a German soldier recog-03 nizes a woman who used to be a dancer and orders her to dance H for him. "She did so, and as she moved into the habitual bodily rhythms and movements from which she had been cut off, she be came reacquainted with the person (herself) from whom she had lost contact; recalling herself in her own mimesis of herself, she re membered who she was, danced up to the officer, moved her hand with grace for his gun, took it, and shot him" (1985, 347; referring to Bettelheim i960). Arthur Jafa (aka A. J. Fielder), cinematographer for Who Needs a Heart? and Daughters of the Dust (among other films), accepts the term "materialist retentionist" to describe his aesthetics:
What that means is that I have a belief in certain levels of cultural reten tion. Nam June Paik, the godfather of video art, has this great quote: "The culture that's going to survive in the future is the culture you can carry in your head." The middle passage is such a clear example of this, because you see black American culture particularly developed around those areas we could carry around in our heads-oratorical prowess, dance, music, those kinds of things. (1992, 6g) Of course, Jafa's examples of "culture you can carry in your head" include knowledges that, like dance and music, are also carried in the body.
C. Nadia Seremetakis devotes a chapter of The Senses Still (1994) to a peach that was once cultivated in the region of Greece where she grew up. The rodhdkino did not travel well and was not known outside of the places it grew. The rise of mass agricultural marketing in Greece, capped by that country's entry into the European Union, made the peach practically disappear from the market. Now, Sere metakis writes, it exists only in the memory of those who used to eat it-"Ah, that peach, what an aroma! and taste! The breast of Aphro dite we called it. These (peaches and other food) today have no taste [d-nosta)" (2). These memories remain embodied in the senses even 201 when their stimulus has disappeared.
Seremetakis argues that the memory of the senses is itself a cul-_3 tural artifact. Sense memories and material artifacts work in the ® same way; both are emissaries of cultural experience. She describes CD a cultural communion with the sense memories inscribed in objects. o These artifacts are often traveling fetishes, of the sort I described in 0 chapter 2: they might include the Zinacanteca women's tight sash £. Clearly the sense memories Seremetakis describes are not only individual, but shared. Her example underscores the argument that social memory is carried in individual bodies. Many artists and theo rists claim sense experience as a site of "freedom" from cultural constraints-Stan Brakhage's desire to "free the eye" (1963) from cultural constraints, Susan Buck-Morss's (1992) suggestion that the body has a "wild," unalienable core of sense experience. But in fact the senses are also sites of cultural expression. Sense organs are the sites where culture crosses the body.
CD
I have emphasized throughout this book that cinema can acti vate inert presences, such as historical archives and fetish objects, and make them volatile so that they intervene in the present. Now I would like to add sense memory to those presences. Seremetakis writes that the Greek etymology of nostalgia is nosto, I return, plus algho, I feel pain (1994, 4) . Nostalgia, then, need not mean an im mobilizing longing for a lost past: it can also mean the ability of past experiences to transform the present.
Perceptual Plasticity and Intersensory Perception
To understand how the senses encode culture, it is necessary to examine how this process takes place in the body. First we must acknowledge that all the senses may be vehicles of memory, and 202 that bodies encode memory in the senses in quite varied ways. As I have noted, Henri Bergson ([1911] 1988) anticipated later research g on perception when he emphasized that the use of the senses is p£ not given but learned. Perception in Bergson's model is plastic; imjg plicitly it is variable according to culture and local need. Thus it "o provides a way to understand the wide range of possible organi-22 zations of sense memory. Some perceptions are more immediate: © smell, taste, and touch usually fall into this category. Other percep-H tions provide more room to maneuver, a "zone of indetermination" (32) in which memory may intervene. However, these distinctions are merely quantitative. All sense perceptions allow for, and indeed require, the mediation of memory. We are "wired" for great variation in the way we use our senses. Our sensorimotor cortex, or the outer layer of the brain where most sensory information is processed, is a map of our sensuous relation ship to the world (Finkel 1992, 399 ). Everybody's cortex is config ured differently, since sense perception, like other mental capaci ties, is reinforced on the basis of use and must be reinforced by continuous practice. Cooks have stronger synaptic connections be tween the sensorimotor cortex and tongue and nasal receptors than the average person. Violinists are found to have a larger cortical representation of the fingers of the left hand than are (presumably right-handed) nonstring players (Elbert et al. 1995, 305) . Other sense capacities tend to adjust accordingly: one would not expect a cook to have an extremely discriminating sense of hearing, for example. The cooperation among the senses is especially evident in the many studies of perception that show that one sense modality can learn to respond to information normally headed for another modality. Con sider the acute hearing of blind people. When I used to rent movies with two blind friends (one congenitally, the other from later in life), their aural perceptiveness astonished me. In the movie a door would open and a new character step into the room; Chris would say, "That's the bad guy," and a couple of scenes later I would find that he was right. Blindness made my friends exquisite aural semioticians.
In cognitive science there is growing interest in the idea that the mind, not the environment, is the source of representation. This need not be a solipsistic argument if we understand the mind itself to be formed through experience. Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thomp son, and Eleanor Rosch (1991) argue that the meanings of sense experience are not given by the world but learned through embodied 203 action, through the complex interaction of cultural and bodily pro cesses. Our perception of color categories, for example, is not a ^ reaction to wavelength and intensity of light, nor is it wholly sub-° jective: they argue that it is both based on apparently physiological CD R universals and culturally specific (168-71). This would suggest that o while there may be physiological bases for everybody's agreement 0 t-b that a certain red is the exemplary red, or that a certain smell is g£ noxious, there is also great cultural variation in the cortical repre-& CD sentation of this information. One culture may not have a word for g CD that exemplary red; people in another culture may be oblivious to w the noxious smell. The implications of this research for intercultural experience are several. First, our sensorium is formed by culture: it produces a map of the "objective" world that reflects our cultural configuration of the senses. Second, our sensorium creates the world "subjectively" for us. Thus, one would expect that in an ocularcentric culture, people will experience and produce the world as a primarily visual world. And a person whose sensorium reflects the cultural importance of smell will produce a world in which smell matters. Third, given the plasticity of neural networks, it is possible to learn a new configura tion of the senses-although learning the memories that accompany it is another matter. The Nose Knows I want to focus on the sense of smell to pursue my argument that the sensorium is malleable, that the sense modalities work in con cert, and that all sense experience is informed by culture. Foreign cultures tend to be both vilified and exoticized in terms of smell. It appears to be universal, and is certainly understandable, that every culture prefers its own world of smells to any other (Classen 1993, 79-80) : as Freud said, our own shit never stinks. But the association of smell with primitivism has served the ends of cultural imperial ism, in the name of civilizing and controlling the perceived odorous excesses of other cultures. Hence my concern to "abase" vision and "elevate" smell, by showing that the one is embodied and intimate, the other cognitive and cultivated. By pulling at these two ends of the sensory hierarchy, I hope to realign all the sensory modalities 204 that lie "between" them in value, in order to reconfigure this hier archy from a scale of values to a wiggle of intensities. g Everyone agrees that learning is verbal, and correspondingly that f£ words are a medium of knowledge. Most will agree that vision can rd be educated as well; hence the term "visual literacy" (which reduces "o the visual to the symbolic). But the senses of hearing (exclusive of 22 the verbal), taste, touch, and smell are less often accepted as senses © that can be educated, that is, as sources of knowledge. Yet I would H argue that olfaction, like the other senses, may be cultivated; there fore the sense of smell can be a source of cultural knowledge. 1 If this case can be made for the lowly sense of smell, then it must be ac cepted that other senses are knowledgeable as well. First we must ask, do human smell preferences have some genetic core or are they entirely learned? It is a common argument that we have an innate, that is, genetic, attraction to odors associated with sexuality, and an innate aversion to odors of danger and death (for example, Stoddart 1990). The latter might explain why, especially in dualistic cultures, smell has been considered a primitive and dan gerously sensual sense. This primitivism might also be explained by Freud's hypothesis that the sense of smell is repressed both phylogenetically and ontogenetically: the first, when humans adopted upright carriage and distanced themselves from their smelly anogenital areas; the second, when a child yields to socialization and abandons its pleasure in its own feces (Freud 1985, 279) .
Humans' famous phylogenetic standing-up may well explain the repression of sensory awareness of sexual and other bodily odors. Now, when we use perfumes, we layer culture onto smell's bio logical substrate, sublimating sexual odors into these more sym bolic scents, olfactory signs for sexuality. Nevertheless, despite this mimicking of biology by culture, I would argue that Freud collapsed the cultural aspects of smell onto the genetic. Sexual sublimation does not explain the complexity with which smell is deployed in different cultures, for example.
The proximal senses of touch, smell, and taste are more central to the experience of most nonhuman creatures, be they chimpanzees or paramecia, than they are to humans. These senses are also more important in the early years of human infancy and childhood: in fants can identify their mothers and other important people through smell before they recognize them visually (Engen 1991, 63) . The distance senses of vision and hearing are more developed in higher 205 animals, and they also develop with human maturity. All this would seem to support the assumption that the "close" senses are primi-^ tive both in the life of the species and in the life of the individual, ^ and that the distance senses are the most "evolved" in both impli-CD cations of the word. Hence, I believe, the unwillingness of many o cultural theorists to broach these topics, from fear of being accused ^ of primitivism and essentialism. Yet it is worth venturing further to »-b CD test these assumptions. &
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While most creatures have strong genetic codings for the smells g of sex, food, danger, and death, for the most part it appears that humans do not (Hines 1997, 79 ). Instead we are genetically wired to learn strong but contextual responses to smells. Centers in the brain for processing different kinds of sensory information develop at different points in the growth of the fetus and infant. Cognition takes place in the cortex, the youngest and most evolved part of the brain (Stoddart 1990, 34) . The hypothalamus, which is noncognitive, is the oldest part of the brain both phylogenetically and ontogenetically: it was once referred to as the rhinencephalon, or "smell brain." This and other parts of the limbic system (notably the amyg dala) deal with memory and emotion. Olfaction is the only sense perception whose neural pathway leads directly to the hypothala mus: this means that olfaction alone has a fundamentally noncognitive component.
2 Yet simultaneously another neural pathway leads from the nose (strictly speaking, the olfactory bulb) to the cortex. This means that smell is processed cognitively at the same time that it awakens deep-seated, precognitive memories. Memories of smell endure much longer, even after a single exposure to an odor, than visual or auditory memories. Yet smell is difficult to verbalize and visualize (Schab 1991, 243) . Smells are easier to identify through personal memory associations than by name (and Schab's article invests these associations with nostalgia: "grandma's kitchen" vs. "floor wax"; "the tobacco grandfather used to smoke" vs. "Prince Albert tobacco" [245, 246] ). We respond emotionally to a smell first, and then we name it: asphalt, magnolia, grandma's kitchen. Since we process smell both cognitively and precognitively, we learn emo tional responses to smell. We learn to love our mothers' smell, be it sweat or perfume (Engen 1991, 63-74) , to identify the smell of home, be it fish sauce or mildew, and to build new associations
